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HEALTHY ZONING 
Matthew J. Parlow* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores local governments’ foray into the area of health 
regulation through their general regulatory and land use powers.  Local 
governments are limited in their powers: they enjoy only those powers that 
the state permits them and, in some cases, only those that they choose to 
embrace themselves.  Health care and health law have traditionally been the 
domain of federal and state governments.  However, many local governments 
have begun to use what powers they have to attempt to address obesity and 
other health problems that plague many communities.  In fact, land use law 
may be the most important and powerful tool at local governments’ disposal 
to create meaningful and positive impacts on our collective health.  This 
Article analyzes the different ways in which local governments are using 
their general regulatory and land use powers to promote greater health 
among their citizenry.  Many of these health initiatives are controversial.  
Critics view local government action in this sphere as infringing on a policy 
area reserved for the federal and state governments or, at the very least, 
exceeding local government powers.  Accordingly, this Article will also 
identify and address some of the challenges that such local government 
efforts face. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is an ongoing debate—both descriptive and normative—among 
local government law scholars about whether local governments1 have, or 
should have, robust or limited powers.2  This debate focuses largely on cities’ 
powers vis-à-vis their respective state governments.  This scholarly 
discourse has provided a forum for the rise of localism, a theory based on a 
preference for local government control and authority.3  While this localist 
focus has been driven by a number of concerns and influences such as 
efficiency and self-government,4 one of the primary motivations is the 
prospect that local governments will further innovative policy initiatives that 
could inform policy- and decision-making at higher levels of government.5  
Indeed, due to the political strife and gridlock that exists at the state and 
federal government levels, local governments, in many respects, are better 
“laborator[ies] of democracy” than Justice Louis Brandeis envisioned the 
states to be.6 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. In this article, I use the terms local governments, cities, suburbs, municipalities, and 
localities interchangeably to refer to local government entities. 
 2. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 632-35 
(2001); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1990). 
 3. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter:  Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000). 
 4. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 294-99 (1993). 
 5. See Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 
1859-63 (2010). See generally Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? 
Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009). 
 6. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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As Professor Charles Tiebout describes in his seminal theory, local 
governments have tended to be more innovative than states because they 
compete against each other to attract and retain consumer-voters.7  
Consumer-voters can “vote with their feet” and leave one city for another if 
the package of goods, services, and taxes offered by a particular municipality 
is not to their liking.8  Accordingly, local governments compete with one 
another by providing residents and businesses with a distinct set of policies, 
regulations, services, and the like to respond to the needs and interests of 
consumer-voters.9  This dynamic creates an efficient local government 
marketplace where people with similar values and preferences tend to locate 
in the same municipalities.10  Such homogeneity provides local governments 
with the ability to experiment with policies that might not be politically 
viable at other levels of government.11  Thus, local governments have pushed 
innovative policies that could not gain traction on the state or federal level 
in areas such as marriage equality,12 climate change,13 immigration,14 
marijuana legalization,15 and raising the minimum wage.16 
One area where local governments have become particularly active in 
recent years is health policy.  This development is noteworthy as an example 
of local government innovation and experimentation, since health policy has 
                                                                                                                                      
 7. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
419 (1956). 
 8. See id. at 418. But see Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within:  Seeking 
Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 615 (2007) 
(questioning how easily people can move given the expense of moving, proximity to family, 
and other reasons); Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade 
Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1115 (2008) (explaining why residents are not as mobile 
as Tiebout theorized). 
 9. See Tiebout, supra note 7, at 419-20. 
 10. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1619, 1628-32 (2008). 
 11. See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & 
POL. 1 (2006). 
 12. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148-53 (2005) (detailing the City and County of San 
Francisco’s provision of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and the attendant role of local 
governments to act in this policy area). 
 13. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate 
Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 410-11 (2008) (describing how many cities in the 
United States took direct action to address harmful emissions). 
 14. See Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 367, 
371-405 (2010) (analyzing local government immigration regulation). 
 15. See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets 
Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4 (2010) 
(detailing cities’ laws related to medical marijuana). 
 16. See David Neumark, Living Wages:  Protection for or Protection From Low-Wage 
Workers, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 27, 28-29 (2004) (detailing various cities’ living wage 
laws). 
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traditionally been the domain of the federal and state governments.17  In 
response to increasing societal health problems—ones that other levels of 
governments have been unsuccessful in addressing—many municipalities 
have begun using their general regulatory and land use powers to attempt to 
improve the health of their residents.  These efforts have ranged from the 
adoption of a universal health care law, as in San Francisco,18 to the new 
urbanism movement—an approach that seeks to reduce the reliance on 
automobiles and promote community integration through pedestrian-
friendly, mixed-use development—that have taken root in many American 
cities.19  This kind of local government policy experimentation exemplifies 
the innovation that localism scholars advocate, even though—as discussed 
further below—it is often met with political resistance and legal challenges. 
This Article seeks to highlight the evolution of health policy on a local 
level and situate it in local government and land use scholarship.  Part I 
explains the reasons why various municipalities have focused on health-
related matters.  Part II analyzes the ways in which local governments have 
used their general regulatory and land use powers to positively impact the 
health of those who live and work within their boundaries.  Part III addresses 
some of the challenges that these local health policy efforts face, and the 
Article’s Conclusion provides some final thoughts. 
I.  THE HEALTH CONCERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Local governments are increasingly focused on health policy in response 
to the growing body of evidence that illustrates the impact of the built 
environment20 on the health of individuals in a community.21  Specifically, 
urban sprawl—and its attendant “complex pattern of land use, transportation, 
and social and economic development”22—has contributed to public health 
issues such as obesity and asthma. 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and 
the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2013). 
 18. See Brian P. Goldman, Note, The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance:  
Universal Health Care Beyond ERISA’s Reach?, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362-67 
(2008). 
 19. See Morgan E. Rog, Note, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use, 
and the Environment, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 717-19 (2010). 
 20. See Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of 
Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 710-11 (1991) (explaining that the built environment is the 
physical space where people live, work, and play—those communities that we have physically 
built and populate). 
 21. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale 
and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1221-23 (2014). 
 22. See Howard Frumkin, Urban Sprawl and Public Health, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 201, 
201 (2002). 
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A. Obesity 
There is an obesity epidemic both globally and in the United States.23  In 
the United States, more than one-third of adults are considered obese.24  One 
study found that in 2010, forty-three million preschool children globally 
were considered obese or overweight—constituting a sixty percent increase 
in the past two decades.25  Moreover, low-income, minority, and rural 
communities experience higher than average rates of disease related to 
obesity.26  The costs of obesity on the American health care system are 
estimated to be between $147 billion and $210 billion annually.27  Moreover, 
the chronic diseases associated with obesity—including diabetes and heart 
disease—are among the leading causes of death in the United States.28  This 
obesity epidemic is not confined to the United States.  The worldwide obesity 
rate has almost doubled since 1980,29 and one international study projected 
that by 2025, twenty percent of the world’s population will be obese.30 
To be sure, there are many causes of obesity, including factors such as a 
person’s diet and genetic make-up.  Nonetheless, in recent years, public 
health experts, urban planners, and local government officials have come to 
understand the ways in which the built environment of many metropolitan 
regions contributes to the increase in obesity rates.31  Indeed, as some 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. See Tamara Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 587, 587 (2010). 
 24. See Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/obesity/data/adult.html [https://perma.cc/YC5H-P6RV] (citing Cynthia L. Ogden et. al., 
Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults and Youth: United States, 2011-2014, NCHS data brief, 
no 219, (2015)). 
 25. See Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Obesity Trends:  Tracking the Global 
Epidemic, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-
source/obesity-trends/#ref1 [https://perma.cc/X9AF-VYWZ]; see also Jennifer L. Harris & 
Samantha K. Graff, Protecting Children from Harmful Food Marketing: Options for Local 
Government to Make a Difference, 8 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 2-3 (2011) (describing 
how food marketing leads to greater childhood obesity). 
 26. See Access to Healthy Foods in Low-Income Neighborhoods, YALE UNIV. RUDD 
CENTER FOR FOOD POL’Y & OBESITY 1, 2 (2008), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/hems/
nutrition/pdf/yale_rudd_center_access_to_healthy_foods_report_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HB68-9EYJ]. 
 27. See The Healthcare Costs of Obesity, THE STATE OF OBESITY, http://stateofobesity.
org/healthcare-costs-obesity/ [https://perma.cc/Q9AL-LSR7]. 
 28. See Marice Ashe et al., Prevention and Treatment: Solutions Beyond the Individual, 
35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 138, 138 (2007). 
 29. HOWARD FRUMKIN et al., URBAN SPRAWL AND PUBLIC HEALTH: DESIGNING, PLANNING 
AND BUILDING FOR HEALTH COMMUNITIES, at xi, xiv (2004). 
 30. See Joshua Berlinger, 1 in 5 People Will Be Obese by 2025, Study Says, CNN (Apr. 
6, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/health/global-obesity-study/ [https://perma.cc/
X42F-EFAR]. 
 31. See William L. Roper et al., Heath and Smart Growth:  Building Health, Promoting 
Active Communities, FUNDER’S NETWORK FOR SMART GROWTH AND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES 
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
scholars have posited that “[t]he modern America of obesity [and] 
inactivity . . . has not happened to us.  We legislated, subsidized, and planned 
it this way.”32  Even if such results were not deliberately designed, there is 
no doubt that the way in which cities permit and incentivize land use directly 
impacts the health of those in their communities.33 
Urban sprawl in particular seems to be a contributing factor to the obesity 
epidemic.  As one reporter quipped, “[a]s communities sprawl into 
automobile-dependent developments and suburbs, so do their residents’ 
waistlines spread.”34  Urban sprawl has been characterized by four key 
features: a widely-dispersed population in a low-density development; 
homes, shops, and workplaces that are distinctly separated; a network of 
roads with large blocks and poor access; and a lack of identifiable activity 
centers such as a downtown area.35  These characteristics, in turn, inevitably 
lead to—or correspond with—a lack of public transportation, a strong 
reliance on automobiles, and a decrease in neighborhood schools and 
recreational opportunities.36 
This increase in automobile dependence and the lack of meaningful public 
transportation options have led to a more sedentary culture in the United 
States.37  With longer distances to schools, workplaces, and other 
destinations, more Americans have turned to their cars to fulfill their 
transportation needs.38  In this regard, urban sprawl has led to a decrease in 
walking and bicycling and an increase in automobile usage as a form of 
transportation.39  In fact, research shows that more than 90% of all trips in 
the United States are made by automobiles, even though 28% of those trips 
were for fewer than one mile and an additional 13% of trips were for fewer 
                                                                                                                                      
1, 2 (2003), http://www.fundersnetwork.org/files/learn/Health_and_Smart_Growth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JL6-XTL9]. 
 32. See FRUMKIN, supra note 29, at xi. 
 33. See Roper, supra note 31, at 2. 
 34. Jim Shamp, Study: Less Need for Cars Drops Weight, Blood Pressure, HERALD-SUN, 
Aug. 29, 2003, at B1. 
 35. See Alyson L. Geller, Smart Growth: A Prescription for Livable Cities, 93 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1410, 1410 (2003). 
 36. See id.  Given the development of urban sprawl, localities find it challenging—if not 
impossible—to create public transportation systems that can work both logistically and within 
limited budgets. 
 37. See id. at 1410-11. 
 38. See Joe Baird, CDC Calls Sprawl a Health Risk: Poor City Planning Linked to 
Diabetes and Asthma, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Nov. 2, 2002, at A1. 
 39. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 205. 
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than two miles.40  Even leisurely physical activity appears to have lessened 
due to urban sprawl.41 
The lack of access to healthy foods in many urban communities has also 
led to an increase in obesity rates in those communities.  As urban sprawl 
took root, families moved to the suburbs and so did many of the retail and 
grocery stores that had previously served various communities within the 
city.42  The disappearance of grocery stores in many urban communities 
created “food deserts”—areas within cities where low-income residents have 
limited access to healthy food options, such as fruits, vegetables, and non-
processed foods.43  Many low-income residents lack access to reliable 
transportation—public or private—to access grocery stores in the suburbs, 
and thus resort to shopping for food at convenience stores, liquor stores, or 
fast-food restaurants.44  These options provide mostly high-calorie, high-fat 
food options.45  It should come as no surprise that communities marked as 
food deserts tend to have higher rates of obesity and other attendant health 
problems because of this lack of access to healthy food options. 
B. Asthma 
The built environment in many communities—and, specifically, those 
marked by urban sprawl—also negatively impacts those suffering from 
asthma and other respiratory ailments.  Approximately twenty-four million 
Americans suffer from asthma.46  While asthma rates have been increasing 
in the United States, the disease disproportionately affects low-income, 
minority communities in major urban centers.47  However, even in the 
suburbs, the lack of physical activity and the automobile-dependency 
                                                                                                                                      
 40. JAMES A. KUSHNER, HEALTHY CITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF URBAN PLANNING, LAW 
AND HEALTH, at 110 (2007). 
 41. See Bradford McKee, As Suburbs Grow, So Do Waistlines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, 
at F1. 
 42. See M. Nathaniel Mead, Urban Issues: The Sprawl of the Food Desert, 116 ENVIRON. 
HEALTH PERSPECT. A335, A335 (2008). 
 43. See id. Approximately twenty-nine million people in the United States live in 
communities that lack access to healthy food options. See Deborah L. Rhode, Obesity and 
Public Policy: A Roadmap for Reform, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 491, 497 (2015). 
 44. See Kate Meals, Comment, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice: Unearthing the 
Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in Urban African-American 
Communities, 15 SCHOLAR 97, 121-22 (2012). 
 45. See Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal 
Government’s Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 529, 540 (2007). 
 46. See Asthma, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/asthma.htm [https://perma.cc/KQG5-NHK5] (noting that 17.7 million adults and 6.3 
million children suffer from asthma). 
 47. See Alina Das, The Asthma Crisis in Low-Income Communities of Color: Using the 
Law as a Tool for Promoting Public Health, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 276-81 
(2007). 
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detailed above puts people at greater risk for respiratory ailments.48  Despite 
the decrease in automobile emissions in recent years, automobiles are still 
the greatest source of air pollution because the number of cars and trucks on 
the road—and the number of miles that they drive—has increased.49  In fact, 
motor vehicles are responsible for somewhere between a third and a half of 
smog in most metropolitan regions.50  Such air pollution leads to a “higher 
incidence and severity of respiratory symptoms, worse lung function, more 
emergency room visits and hospitalizations, more medication use, and more 
absenteeism from school and work.”51  In these regards, the built 
environment and urban sprawl have negatively impacted the respiratory 
health of those living and working in many communities. 
II.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ INNOVATIVE HEALTH POLICY INITIATIVES 
Historically, local governments waded into health policy largely to 
address unsanitary conditions and to ward off outbreaks of diseases such as 
cholera and tuberculosis.52  In the 19th and early 20th centuries, public health 
officials and urban planners worked together to create sewer systems and 
design zoning plans to keep certain unsanitary land uses away from schools 
and homes.53  By the middle of the 20th century, the threats of inadequate 
sanitation and infectious diseases had subsided, and public health officials 
shifted their focus away from land use to food safety, venereal diseases, and 
prenatal and early childhood health care.54  However, with the rise of urban 
sprawl—and the attendant chronic health problems to which it contributed—
local government officials have refocused on using their general regulatory 
and land use powers to improve public health within their jurisdictions.55 
A. Non-Land Use Health Policies on the Local Level 
In recent years, local governments have implemented non-land use 
regulations to promote healthier eating by those who eat within their 
boundaries.  While food regulation is oftentimes viewed as the domain of the 
state and federal governments, various municipalities have found innovative 
                                                                                                                                      
 48. See Kushner, supra note 40, at 3. 
 49. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 202. 
 50. See Geller, supra note 35, at 1411. 
 51. See Frumkin, supra note 22, at 202. 
 52. See Wendy C. Perdue et al., Public Health and the Built Environment: Historical, 
Empirical, and Theoretical Foundations for an Expanded Role, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 557, 
557-58 (2003). 
 53. See id. at 558. 
 54. See id. at 558-59. 
 55. See Juliana Maantay, Public Health Matters: Zoning, Equity, and Public Health, 91 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1033, 1033 (2001). 
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ways to counter negative health trends in their communities through menu-
labeling laws, and bans on “happy meals,” sugary sodas, and trans-fats. 
1. Menu-Labeling Laws 
In response to the obesity epidemic, many cities adopted menu-labeling 
laws to help consumers make healthier—and better-informed—food 
choices.56  Studies have shown that most people, including nutritionists, 
underestimate the amount of calories in some foods.57  Such underestimation 
leads people to perceive oversized, high-calorie portions as being normal-
sized portions, and thus unknowingly eat far more calories than they 
originally anticipated.58  To combat this phenomenon, and encourage well-
informed nutritional decision-making, many local governments have 
adopted laws that mandate disclosure of the amount of calories for each item 
on a restaurant’s menu.59  In 2006, New York City became the first city to 
adopt a menu-labeling law.60  The New York City regulation required that 
menus display the calorie content value for menu items served in 
standardized portions.61  The law applied to any group of fifteen or more 
food service establishments doing business nationally under the same name 
and offering the substantially same items on their menus.62  Failure to 
comply with the new requirements earned a restaurant a fine between $200 
and $2000.63 
This movement to educate eaters on their caloric intake soon proliferated 
among municipalities throughout the United States.64  While the specifics of 
these laws varied somewhat by jurisdiction, these laws generally targeted 
larger chain restaurants for at least three reasons.  First, restaurant chains 
                                                                                                                                      
 56. See Ashley Arthur, Note, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National 
Standard to Replace the Growing Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 305, 314 (2010). 
 57. See Christine Cusick, Comment, Menu-Labeling Laws: A Move from Local to 
National Regulation, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 989, 1017 (2011). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Arthur, supra note 56, at 306. 
 60. See Jodi Schuette Green, Note, Cheeseburger in Paradise? An Analysis of How New 
York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health May Reform Our Fast 
Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 746 (2010). 
 61. See Brent Bernell, Article, The History and Impact of the New York City Menu 
Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839, 845-46 (2010). 
 62. See id. at 845. 
 63. See Jason M. Szanyi, Brain Food: Bringing Psychological Insights to Bear on Modern 
Nutrition Labeling Efforts, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 159, 172 (2010). 
 64. See Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling Law and 
Lessons from Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 908-09 (2010); see also Lainie 
Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling Laws 
and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 775-76 (2008) 
(describing various state and local menu labeling laws). 
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tend to use standardized menu items, making it easier to measure or estimate 
accurate calories per serving.65  Second, chain restaurants also make up a 
disproportionate share of restaurant meals in many cities.66  Third, chain 
restaurants tend to serve less healthy food that can contribute to obesity.67  
Interestingly, these local laws eventually influenced some states to adopt 
similar menu-labeling laws.68  In fact, similar menu-labeling requirements 
were incorporated into the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.69 
2. “Happy Meal” Bans 
San Francisco adopted an ordinance—known as the “happy meal” ban—
that aimed to prevent fast food restaurants from using toy incentives to target 
children’s food preferences.  Many fast food companies provide a free toy in 
kids’ meals as an enticement to children to influence their parents to buy 
them food at these establishments.70  These promotions can sometimes more 
than double weekly sales of kids’ meals at these restaurants.71  The most 
recognizable kids’ meal that has a toy incentive is McDonald’s Happy Meal, 
which also happens to be among the unhealthiest kids’ meals.72 
A bit of history regarding marketing junk food to children is helpful to 
understand San Francisco’s impetus in adopting its “happy meal” law.  
During the 1970s, the federal government—through the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)—attempted to limit children’s exposure to marketing 
and advertisements of unhealthy food options.73  Studies showed that 
children under the age of six were particularly susceptible to such advertising 
because their cognitive abilities were not sufficiently developed to 
distinguish commercial advertising from program content.74  The 
effectiveness of such advertising led fast food companies to spend more than 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. See N.Y.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF 
ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
HEALTH CODE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art
81-50-0108.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5N4-55KS]. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Banker, supra note 64, at 908. 
 69. See Lainie Rutkow et al., Local Governments and the Food System: Innovative 
Approaches to Public Health Law and Policy, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 355, 357 (2013). 
 70. See Alexis M. Etow, Comment, No Toy for You! The Healthy Food Incentives 
Ordinance: Paternalism or Consumer Protection?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2012). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Cortney Price, Comment, The Real Toy Story: The San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 347, 350 (2012). 
 73. See Etow, supra note 70, at 1509. 
 74. See id. 
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$650 million each year on marketing aimed at children.75  However, despite 
the problems it identified, the FTC eventually abandoned its proposed 
regulations of junk food marketing because of the threat of legal challenges 
and political resistance.76 
In response to this link between unhealthy food and toy incentive 
marketing to children—and due to the inability of other levels of government 
to address this concern—San Francisco adopted the Healthy Food Incentives 
Ordinance, now known as its “happy meal” ban.77  The ordinance bans 
restaurants from providing toys, or other incentive items, with a kids’ meal 
that does not meet certain nutritional guidelines.78  The stated purpose of the 
law “is to improve the health of children and adolescents in San Francisco 
by setting healthy nutritional standards for children’s meals sold at 
restaurants in combination with free toys or other incentive items.”79 
San Francisco’s law applies to all restaurants that provide take-out or “to 
go” food services.80  In order for a restaurant to provide a toy or other 
incentive item, the kid’s meal must not exceed 600 calories; 640 mg of 
sodium; half a gram of trans fat; thirty-five percent of its total calories from 
fat; and ten percent of its total calories from saturated fat.81  Moreover, the 
kids’ meal must contain at least a half-cup of fruit and three-fourths of a cup 
of vegetables.82  Accordingly, San Francisco’s “happy meal” ban is actually 
more of an incentive system: that is, the ordinance provides incentives and 
sets minimum standards encouraging fast food restaurants to provide 
healthier menu options if they want to market to children through toys or 
other giveaways.83  However, if a restaurant or other food service 
establishment violates this law, San Francisco can impose a fine.84  While 
there was not a proliferation of similar laws following the San Francisco 
ordinance,85 the “happy meal” ban received much national attention and 
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raised awareness of the issue of unhealthy food options for children linked 
to free toys or other incentive items. 
3. Soda Bans 
Other cities target another culprit that contributes to obesity, diabetes, and 
heart disease problems facing their communities: sugary sodas.86  Following 
the lead of some major school districts, several cities adopted soda 
restrictions.87  New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s proposal to limit 
the size of sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the city garnered a lot of 
national media coverage.88  On September 13, 2012, the New York City 
Board of Health approved the Mayor’s proposal to cap the size of sugar-
sweetened beverages sold in food service establishments to sixteen ounces 
or less.89  The law applied to both carbonated and non-carbonated 
beverages—even though it became popularly-known as a “soda ban”—that 
exceed certain sweetening metrics.90  However, only food service and self-
serve establishments are subject to the law, so businesses like 7-Elevens and 
grocery stores are exempt.91  Businesses which violate the ordinance are 
subject to a fine of up to $200.92  Other cities also adopted similar measures 
to create healthier drink options for those in their jurisdictions.93 
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4. Trans-Fat Bans 
Cities have also used their general regulatory powers to target trans fats, 
which are solid or semi-solid fats that have been converted from liquid 
vegetable oils through partial hydrogenation.94  During the 20th century, the 
use of trans fats became widespread: more than 45,000 food products—
including cookies, crackers, and frozen breakfast items—were made using 
trans fats.95  Many food producers use trans fats because they are inexpensive 
to use, improve taste and texture, and extend the shelf life of the foods.96  
However, trans fats are one of the most problematic types of fat because they 
contribute to a rise in “bad” cholesterol and a decrease in “good” 
cholesterol.97  In response, several local governments moved to ban trans fats 
in their jurisdictions.  For example, after a voluntary trans-fat ban proved 
unsuccessful, New York City adopted an ordinance in 2006 that required 
restaurants to cease using trans fats by July 1, 2008.98  The law applied to 
both sit-down restaurants and outdoor vendors.99  Several other cities and 
states similarly adopted trans-fat bans,100 and the United States Food and 
Drug Administration recently announced that it is moving forward with a 
trans-fat ban.101 
B. Local Land Use Policies Aimed at a Healthier Citizenry 
While local governments have used their general regulatory powers to 
adopt health policy ordinances, there may be no greater area where cities can 
positively impact the health of those living and working within their 
boundaries than land use planning.  Perhaps this observation is unsurprising 
given that, as one scholar notes, “land use is perhaps the most important 
single power left to local governments.”102  Armed with the power of 
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zoning—as an exercise of the police power reserved to the states by the Tenth 
Amendment and delegated to local governments through most states’ 
constitutions or statutes103—cities have attempted to influence and regulate 
the health of their citizenry.  In particular, municipalities have focused on a 
variety of land use approaches to accomplish this goal: adopting New 
Urbanism and Smart Growth zoning strategies; incorporating health 
elements into their general plans; providing incentives to open grocery stores 
in food deserts; restricting access to fast food restaurants and liquor stores; 
and experimenting with other innovative zoning approaches to encourage 
access to healthy food.  While “[l]and use planning in the United States has 
been based on the segregation of uses by type primarily to prevent nuisance 
or external costs,”104 cities have demonstrated how they can use their land 
use powers to influence human behavior and thus effect health policy in a 
meaningful way.105 
1. New Urbanism, Smart Growth, and Zoning 
In response to urban sprawl and the rising rates of obesity, many cities are 
embracing New Urbanism and Smart Growth approaches to zoning.  New 
Urbanism emphasizes design elements for the built environment that reduce 
the reliance on automobiles and promote community integration through 
higher density development, public transportation, public green spaces, 
pedestrian-friendly development, and mixed-use neighborhoods.106  This 
approach promotes the ability for people to live, work, and play, all in the 
same community, thus increasing physical activity and reducing the need for 
automobiles.107  In this regard, New Urbanism seeks to “afford[ ] an 
opportunity for people to be active without the need to plan for physical 
activity.”108  Similarly, Smart Growth is a land use planning movement that 
promotes building and revitalizing communities through mixed-use, high-
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density development.109  To that end, Smart Growth seeks “more efficient 
use of existing infrastructure, and transportation choices.”110  Moreover, this 
land use approach aims to advance public health and healthier communities 
through neighborhood designs—or redesigns—that encourage biking and 
walking.111 
The New Urbanism and Smart Growth movements have made significant 
strides in recent years.112  While critics remain,113 one only needs to look at 
most major cities—and many smaller and mid-size cities—to see the 
influence of these anti-sprawl, growth management approaches.  Cities 
advance these types of developments for a variety of reasons, but one of their 
motivations is to improve the health of those who live and work within their 
boundaries. 
2. Health Elements in General Plans 
Some cities have extended the theories behind the New Urbanism and 
Smart Growth movements to their general plans114 by incorporating public 
health goals into them.115  A general plan is a city’s “policy guide to 
decisions about the physical development of the community.”116  General 
plans are forward-looking and seek to create objectives and parameters 
regarding “how, why, when and where to build, rebuild, and preserve the 
city.”117  Many states require municipalities to develop such plans for zoning 
and land use development, including general policies—commonly referred 
to as elements—to help meet a community’s varying needs.  These elements 
explain the physical development of the city—both in its current state and in 
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the community’s aspirations for future development.118  While states require 
different elements, all general plans include land use and public facilities 
elements.119  Some general plans include elements covering economic 
development, natural resources, housing, and population and 
demographics.120 
In recent years, some cities have added health elements to their general 
plans.121  The City of Richmond, California, was the first city to do so.122  In 
2007, Richmond received a grant from the California Endowment Trust to 
develop a health element to address issues such as diabetes, obesity, and 
asthma faced by its residents.123  Richmond’s health element makes key 
findings related to its community’s collective health, including the need for 
more park space, access to healthy food, emergency services, usable public 
transportation, and walkable neighborhoods, as well as the existence of 
noise, water, air, and soil pollution.124  The element then sets forth health-
related goals that should inform and influence the city’s zoning and land use 
decision-making: improving access to parks and other recreational open 
space; expanding access to healthy food options; enhancing medical 
services; providing safe and reliable public transportation; improving 
environmental quality; and adopting green and sustainable development and 
practices.125  To implement such goals, the health element also contains 
policies and actions meant to achieve consistency and success across the 
city.126 
Since Richmond began pursuing a health element in 2007, other cities 
have adopted health elements into their general plans.127  This growing trend 
signals an awareness of cities’ ability to influence health policy through their 
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zoning and land use powers.  By incorporating a health element into their 
general plan, these cities have provided not just a policy preference, but a 
legal basis for improving the health of their citizenry. 
3. Siting Grocery Stores in Food Deserts 
In addition to their general plans, cities are using their zoning powers in 
an attempt to increase resident access to healthy foods.  As detailed above, 
many low-income communities lack access to grocery stores and other 
establishments that provide healthy food options—creating the phenomenon 
of the food desert.128  There are significant obstacles facing cities that seek 
to attract grocery stores into these neighborhoods.  For example, full-service 
supermarkets require up to 150,000 square feet.129  Moreover, grocery stores 
require a substantial number of parking spaces, and there are rarely vacant 
lots available in urban areas to accommodate these kinds of square footage 
and parking needs.130 
Despite these challenges, many cities have found creative ways to use 
their zoning and land use powers to provide incentives for grocery stores to 
locate in their food deserts.  For example, New York City established the 
Food Retail Expansion to Support Health (“FRESH”) initiative for the 
purpose of “establish[ing] and expan[ding] neighborhood grocery stores in 
underserved communities by providing zoning and financial incentives.”131  
In addition to providing tax and other financial incentives (like low-interest 
loans), the FRESH program uses zoning to encourage grocery stores to locate 
in certain neighborhoods: reducing the parking required for grocery stores 
and permitting grocery stores as of right in light manufacturing districts.132  
Similarly, Philadelphia created incentives for grocery stores that carry a 
qualifying percentage of fresh foods.133  Philadelphia not only exempts fresh 
food supermarkets from floor area limits, but it provides such stores with an 
additional 25,000 in permitted square footage.134  Philadelphia also exempts 
grocery stores from minimum parking requirements for the first 10,000 
square feet of the store.135 
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Baltimore also sought to attract more grocery stores.  Baltimore amended 
its general plan to include a goal that all residents should live within one and 
a half miles from a quality grocery store.136  Through the use of its zoning 
powers, Baltimore was able to attract nineteen new grocery stores from 2000 
to 2011.137  Finally, even smaller cities have adopted zoning measures to 
help site grocery stores in their jurisdiction.  The City of Santa Rosa, 
California, changed its zoning requirements in 2012 to allow grocery stores 
to locate in any commercial district without a conditional use permit—
clearing a significant hurdle for developers in the land use entitlement 
process.138  As these examples demonstrate, cities have identified the public 
health crisis that food deserts create and have responded by using their land 
use and zoning powers to create incentives for supermarkets to locate in these 
low-income neighborhoods. 
4. Restricting Fast Food Restaurants and Liquor Stores 
While cities have created more lenient zoning regulations to attract 
grocery stores, they have also limited the ability of fast food restaurants and 
liquor stores to locate within their boundaries.139  Municipalities recognized 
the link between these types of establishments and obesity rates and sought 
to avoid a proliferation of them in their communities.  Some cities banned 
fast food restaurants within their jurisdiction.140  For example, in 1981, 
Concord, Massachusetts, banned all fast food restaurants and restaurants 
with drive-thru services.141  Other cities banned all chain restaurants—
whether they serve fast food or not—in designated areas or throughout their 
communities (though they almost always grandfathered in existing 
businesses as permissible nonconforming uses).142  In 2008, Los Angeles 
implemented a one-year moratorium on new fast food restaurants in the 
South Los Angeles neighborhood143 before banning the development of new 
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fast food restaurants in low-income areas in 2011.144  Other cities have 
created minimum distance requirements between fast food restaurants and 
schools to limit the density of fast food restaurants in their neighborhoods.145 
Municipalities have also sought to limit the proliferation of liquor stores.  
After the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, residents and community groups 
circulated petitions opposing the rebuilding of more than 200 liquor stores 
that had been destroyed.146  In particular, residents sought to require a 
conditional use permit—a discretionary approval that ensures compatibility 
with surrounding land uses—to rebuild each of the stores.147  In response, 
the city required that owners seeking to rebuild their liquor stores meet 
specific conditions, such as guaranteeing additional security measures and 
limiting the amount of floor space dedicated to alcohol sales.148  As a result, 
most of the liquor stores were not rebuilt.149  Following the Los Angeles 
example, Sacramento and San Marino passed similar ordinances to quell the 
proliferation of liquor stores in their communities.150  Other cities adopted 
other ordinances creating buffer zones around schools, limiting how close a 
liquor store could be to a school.  Others restricted liquor stores’ operations, 
mandating they maintain certain hours of operation, and keep the store well 
lit and free of litter and graffiti.151  Other cities tried a dispersion approach: 
the City of Bell, California, implemented a law that required a minimum of 
300 feet between each liquor store.152 
While there are multiple reasons for these fast food and liquor store 
ordinances—including preserving neighborhood character or protecting 
local businesses—the health goals underlying them obviously play a role in 
their adoption, even when they are not always explicitly acknowledged.153  
In fact, the Los Angeles fast food moratorium in 2008 explicitly identified 
the desire to attract healthier food options such as grocery stores and sit-
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down restaurants to combat the detrimental health effects of over 
concentrated fast food restaurants in the southern portion of the city.154  This 
example provides a largely unspoken, though clearly well-known concern 
for cities: to improve the health of its citizens, a city may need to more 
carefully regulate the fast food restaurants and liquor stores that contribute 
to unhealthy lifestyles. 
5. Other Innovative Land Use and Zoning Approaches to Health Policy 
In addition to employing traditional zoning and land use powers, some 
cities have experimented with innovative approaches to improving 
community health, such as promoting urban agriculture through their zoning 
codes.  Urban agriculture is “the process of growing and distributing food 
and other edible products through plant cultivation and animal husbandry 
within and around city limits.”155  This broad term encompasses activities 
such as community gardens, backyard farming, and urban beekeeping.156  
Some cities view urban agriculture as part of the solution to food deserts 
because it promotes the availability of fresh foods in the communities in 
which the foods are grown and raised.157  However, many cities’ current 
zoning regulations impede urban agriculture by restricting livestock, urban 
gardens, the sale of farm products, and even the height of vegetation.158 
In response, some cities have amended their zoning codes to encourage 
urban agriculture.  For example, some local governments allow residents to 
keep chickens on their properties in order to provide a sustainable and 
affordable source of fresh eggs.159  Baltimore amended its zoning to permit 
beekeeping so long as each hive is placed on a parcel of at least 2500 square 
feet.160  Other cities allowing urban beekeeping addressed concerns 
regarding the potential disruption to neighbors by imposing setback 
requirements on hives.161  Some cities have loosened their zoning restrictions 
to permit livestock in urban areas, though with distinct setback and minimum 
lot size requirements.162 
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Many municipalities have also sought to spur community gardens through 
changes to their zoning codes or their general plans.  For example, the City 
of Glendale, California, adopted an ordinance that permitted community 
gardens in residential districts organized by homeowners’ associations.163  
Glendale also permitted them by right in commercial and mixed-use districts, 
when run by non-profit organizations.164  Similarly, Denver amended its 
zoning code to permit urban gardening, as well as commercial gardening, 
within all zoning districts.165  Seattle also changed its zoning to allow 
community gardens in all of its zones.166  Likewise, “Chicago amended its 
zoning ordinance to allow ‘community gardens’ up to 25,000 square feet” 
by right within residential zones and urban farms greater than 25,000 square 
feet in non-residential zones.167  Detroit took a different approach, 
identifying vacant land to be used for community gardens as a goal in its 
general plan.168 
As a consequence of these efforts to grow more sustainable, fresh food in 
their own communities, cities have also had to manage the food’s sales and 
distribution.  To do so, municipalities have reformed their zoning codes to 
permit street vendors, farmers’ markets, and farm stands.169  Portland, 
Oregon, relaxed its zoning restrictions on street vendors so that vendors can 
sell on any sidewalk within a commercial zone, as long as they comply with 
certain cart width requirements, maintain a minimum distance from building 
entrances, and obtain the permission of the building owners.170  San 
Francisco now allows farmers’ markets in city parks, subject to 
administrative approval.171  Local governments have also loosened 
restrictions on farm stands.  For example, Kansas City and Seattle allow farm 
stands with few restrictions, while Berkeley amended its zoning code to 
allow produce to be sold in residential areas as an accessory use.172 
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These zoning reforms advanced local health policy goals beyond merely 
the growth and distribution of healthy foods in neighborhoods.  Street 
vendors, farmers’ markets, and farm stands enhance public health by 
promoting both healthy eating and physical activity.173  Moreover, by 
allowing consumers to obtain fresh food at lower prices than traditional 
grocery stores, they address food affordability, a problem normally 
exacerbated by the food desert dilemma.174 
III.  IMPEDIMENTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 
While local government health policy innovation abounds, municipalities 
face a number of hurdles in employing their land use and general regulatory 
powers to affect such initiatives.  Some of these impediments stem from 
policy restrictions.  For example, some cities face space challenges when 
trying to site supermarkets in food deserts within their boundaries.  Full-
service supermarkets can require up to 150,000 square feet plus additional 
space for parking.175  Therefore, finding suitable locations for grocery stores 
in urban areas is often difficult.  In addition, many cities may also find that 
their general plans and zoning codes are outdated and need significant 
updating—not always a simple process—in order to advance some of the 
aforementioned initiatives.176 
Local governments may also face political resistance to these reforms.  
Specifically, some residents may not believe that it is the appropriate role for 
their city to restrict food options through measures such as soda bans and 
zoning limitations for liquor stores and fast-food restaurants.177  Indeed, 
opponents of this type of municipal action criticize the government for 
overreaching and acting as a “nanny state.”178  Resident resistance may also 
be exacerbated by the fact that obesity is a complex problem with various 
contributing factors—thus no one law or ordinance will necessarily produce 
the desired results.179 
Yet the most significant impediments to local government efforts in health 
policy are legal ones: in particular, cities’ limited powers as local 
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governments coupled with the strength of state preemption.  Municipalities 
have long been recognized as “creatures of the state.”180  States thus create—
and abolish—local governments and provide them with various powers if 
they so choose.181  States generally follow one of two approaches to local 
government powers: Dillon’s Rule or home rule.  States that follow Dillon’s 
Rule—approximately ten states do so—provide municipalities with a finite 
set of powers that are expressly delegated to them.182  State home rule 
provisions delegate legislative authority for local matters to charter cities 
except for those areas reserved by or for the state.183  Thus, cities in states 
that follow Dillon’s Rule have more limited powers than those in home rule 
states.184  Home rule states are usually categorized as either imperio home 
rule or legislative home rule.185  In imperio home rule states, municipalities 
have authority to regulate matters of local concern, but less power to regulate 
in subjects of statewide interest.186  Legislative home rule provides cities 
with all of the Tenth Amendment police powers delegated to their respective 
states, but the states reserve the right to preempt such local authority.187  
While legislative home rule cities have broader regulatory authority enabling 
them to adopt health policy ordinances, such action may have tenuous legal 
footing, because the state may preempt it. 
Therefore, the greatest threat to local government experimentation and 
innovation is state preemption.  State preemption of local laws can be either 
express or implied.188  Express preemption occurs when states explicitly 
announce in their constitution or a statute that municipalities cannot legislate 
or regulate in a particular field because it is reserved for state legislation.189  
Implicit preemption occurs when state courts invalidate local laws, finding 
that the state intended to occupy a particular field or policy area despite the 
lack of explicit constitutional or statutory language suggesting such an 
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intention.190  Indeed, even in matters generally viewed as local affairs, state 
courts tend to side with the state over local governments in a preemption 
challenge.191 
State preemption has become a tool used by business groups opposed to 
these new health policies to block or overturn such laws.192  For example, 
after San Francisco adopted its “happy meal” ordinance, businesses were 
successful in lobbying the State of Arizona to pass a law prohibiting local 
governments from regulating incentive items to their customers—expressly 
preempting this area of law and policy.193  Similarly, the State of Tennessee 
preempted municipal menu-disclosure laws after Davidson County passed 
one.194  The State of Ohio also attempted to preempt municipal trans-fat bans 
after Cleveland adopted one in 2011.195  The Ohio Restaurant Association 
lobbied the Ohio legislature to pass a statute expressly preempting local 
government regulation in this and other health policy areas, such as 
advertising practices and incentive item giveaways.196  Cleveland challenged 
the state preemption as unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution—which 
provides cities like Cleveland the ability to regulate in the interest of public 
health consistent with their police powers—and ultimately prevailed.197  
Nevertheless, the strength and specter of state preemption poses a significant 
challenge to local government efforts to regulate in the field of health policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Local governments’ foray into health policy has demonstrated innovative 
approaches to combating obesity and other health-related concerns that the 
federal and state governments have not been successful in addressing.  
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that these municipal ordinances are 
bringing about some of the desired results that cities hoped they would spur.  
For example, after San Francisco adopted its “happy meal” ban, 
McDonald’s, Jack in the Box, and other fast food restaurants began to 
include healthier food options in kids’ meals.198  Equally important, this local 
government health policy experimentation influenced policy on the state and 
federal levels.  For example, the local menu-labeling laws helped catalyze 
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similar laws statewide in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Oregon.199  
In addition, such local laws served as models for the menu-labeling 
requirements in the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.200 
In these and other respects, local government laws aimed at health policy 
have been both noteworthy and successful.  However, the threat of state 
preemption still looms large.  In particular, as noted above, state preemption 
targeted cities’ general regulatory powers—thus limiting cities’ health policy 
efforts.  The states’ preemption focus may be due to the prevailing view that 
“land use is perhaps the quintessential local responsibility” and power.201  
Yet even in the land use sphere, some state governments have still preempted 
local governments with regard to certain locally undesirable land uses such 
as juvenile facilities and prisons.202  These examples demonstrate that even 
in the land use sphere—which is viewed as largely sacrosanct for local 
governments203—cities’ health policy efforts may be thwarted.  State 
preemption efforts will likely determine whether this type of local 
government innovation in health policy can flourish—allowing cities to 
replace states as the laboratories of democracy that Justice Brandeis 
envisioned. 
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